The section of the PPAHCA devoted to the IPAB makes its purpose clear. To "reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending." In accordance with the sections purpose, the PPAHCA provides, "The board shall develop detailed and specific proposals related to the Medicare program in accordance with the succeeding provisions of this section." Those proposals:
...shall be designed in such a manner that implementation of the recommendations contained in the proposal would not be expected to result, over the 10-year period starting with the implementation year, in any increase in the total amount of net Medicare program spending relative to the total amount of net Medicare program spending that would have occurred absent such implementation.
Coupled with each of these provisions are "requirements" and "considerations". The former outlines the requirements for proposals and the latter outlines what the IPAB, to the extent feasible, shall consider or take in account.
Difficulty arises when certain sections are analyzed under the scope of the entire section. The IPAB's purpose conflicts entirely with sections §§1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). Section §1395kkk(b) states, "it is the purpose of this section, to, in accordance with the following provisions of this section, reduce the per capita growth in Medicare spending." Section §1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) states proposals may not ration care. Section §1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(iii) states, "In the case of proposals submitted prior to December 31, 2018, the proposal shall not include any recommendation that would reduce payment rates for items and services furnished, prior to December 31, 2019 by providers of services...and suppliers..." Both §§1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) defy the IPAB's purpose. When sections are at cross purposes, on what "intelligible principle" do they rely? How is the IPAB to comply with §§1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) and yet comply with its purpose? Without some guiding principle it cannot.
PART V: WHERE ARE THE LIMITS?
Again, the IPAB's purpose is straightforward, "reduce the per capita growth in Medicare spending." To achieve that purpose Congress laid out a broad framework. First, the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services determines the projected per capita growth rate under Medicare for the second year following the determination year. Second, the IPAB—if the projection for the determination year exceeds the target growth rate—is to develop proposals containing recommendations to reduce the Medicare per capita growth rate. And third, the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] is to implement the IPAB's proposals. Guiding this framework are a list of requirements and considerations that the IPAB proposals must meet.
The requirements include the limitation on rationing and the limitation on reductions in payment rates for the first few years. The full list of considerations is contained in sections §§1395kkk(c)(2)(B)(i) through (vii) and the board must only follow their directives to the "extent feasible". As example, section §1395kkk(c)(2)(B)(i) states the board shall give priority to recommendations that extend Medicare solvency.
In light of the fact that that the limit on reduction on services only applies until 2018 and the considerations are only that, the only tangible "intelligible principle" guiding the IPAB in its proposals is that it not "ration" care. Yet, the word "ration" is hardly an "intelligible principle". Rationing is undefined leaving it entirely up to the IPAB to define rationing. If the IPAB decides a medicine is too costly and does not issue reimbursements, has it violated §1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii)? What if the IPAB engages in an entirely different type of decision making and decides that certain treatments are not necessary? For example, reimbursements for pain medications for minor injuries such as a broken bone. These are two distinct types of decision making that carry very different consequences. If a definition could be adapted to justify either decision, a definition that does so would be without any "intelligible principle". It would instead be nothing more than a arbitrary principle.
Further, in Panama Refining the Court stated "Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited" That is exactly what Congress has done here. By creating only one requirement, a requirement that the IPAB may define itself, Congress has implicitly given the IPAB free reign to accomplish its purpose. The IPAB can deny services, it can reduce payments, it can affect any industry in any way, so long as it "relates to" the Medicare program.
An obvious response to this argument lies in Mistretta. There, the Court recognized that in applying the "intelligible principle" test to congressional delegations, its jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with every changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. Even Panama Refining recognized this principle stating, "The constitution has never been regarded as anything denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function." In Mistretta the Court thus concluded developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate.
Medicare policy could be another "labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate." In 2009 it covered an estimated 45 million people and by 2030 is expected that 80 million people will be enrolled. It also consists of four separate parts all of which are funded differently. With those complexities in mind, Medicare policy very well could be a candidate for Congressional delegation, but no matter of complexity exempts Congress from respecting the Constitution. The guidelines provided the sentencing commission in Mistretta provide a stark contrast to the guidelines provided the IPAB in the PPAHCA.
In Mistretta Congress prescribed the "specific tool—the guidelines systems—for the commission to use in regulating sentencing." Congress further directed the Sentencing Commission to develop a system of sentencing ranges applicable to each category of offense involving each category of defendant. Congress then proscribed specific limits on the Sentencing Commission. Sentences could not exceed statutory maximums. The maximum of the ranges established for sentencing ranges could not exceed the minimum of the that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or six months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment. In addition to its tool, and the limits to which it was to abide by, Congress also provided the Sentencing Commission with seven factors it was to consider.
In the PPAHCA Congress has provided the IPAB with hardly any of this special direction. There is no tool, only a mechanism—the proposals. And these proposals need only relate to the "Medicare Program." There are no factors for the IPAB to consider. And, the only discernible limits are that the IPAB may not "ration" care and not immediately reduce payment rates for items and services by providers of services and suppliers. By leaving the rest of the statute void of any constraints on the IPAB the only conclusion is that absent these two limits, the IPAB may create proposals that carry out policies however it sees fit. The crafting of the IPAB shows none of the careful consideration shown in Mistretta. By eliminating judicial review, Congress seems to have tacitly admitted its guilt. That alone could provide the basis for a constitutional violation because "all agree that Congress cannot bar all remedies for enforcing constitutional rights".