Game theory – A mathematical approach to analyzing strategic interactions between two or more players.
Usually used to describe/predict actors decisions in a socio, economic, and political sphere.
Values are used to describe Utility values for players by choosing to bot.
-------------------------[No Bot]--------LS-Y-------------[Bot]
[No Bot]-----------------{10,10}-----------------------{-2, 20 (-1-p)}
!
LS
X
!
[Bot]------------------{20 (-1-p), -2}--------------{9 (-1 – p), 9 (-1 – p)}
Breakdown of the game: The actual numbers in this game are somewhat arbitrary, as they are in most games but are used to show a ratio of utility values which are not arbitrary.
The gaming environment where no one is botting and there is two fairly equal LS’s or people camping an NM will have an equilibrium of utility values, because their claims on the mob will in the long run generally be split (if LS’s aren’t equal what would happen would there wouldn’t be an equilibrium under not botting and the less equal LS would gain a greater utility from defecting than the other LS would…which would still gain a greater utility assuming the other LS wouldn’t bot, but not as much comparatively). The other values where only one LS defects (from the ToS) shows the shift in utility gained by camping.
The LS that doesn’t bot has a negative utility because their chance to claim is for all intents and purposes gone and they are wasting their time and money via opportunity cost. The LS that does bot gains a significantly higher utility value, double since it is guaranteed vs. 50%; the modifiers on this number are -1 for possible reparations (botting as far as what I’ve been told is not very detectable unless you are doing stupid shit at the same time) and –p : p is a variable that is representative of people’s personal reservations against botting which is generally the greatest modifier in the decision due to a stigma…yet in concrete values botting is almost a logical choice as will be explained.
The last is the equilibrium provided if both LS’s bot the base values of equilibrium are lesser because an artificial mechanism is now used to equal the playing field which is inherently of less utility than just not botting and having a level playing field. The negative variables are the same as before.
Logical actors nonetheless will choose to bot (the p value is so variable that assigning it a large value makes it kind of pointless in actually discussing the use of bots), because if one group chooses to bot your utility is drastically reduced, so even if the equilibrium value for botting is less than not botting it mitigates the risk that your opponent is going to bot and receive a much greater utility.
Obviously, the equilibrium of not botting is best for the commons but because there isn’t a large concrete reparation against it that makes the botting equilibrium have negative values equal to or greater to the negative utility of one LS botting and the other not botting.
The greatest impediment to botting is the p value nonetheless, because of the social stigma applied, but I am sure there are enough jaded endgamers out there who really could give a shit about the p value and are therefore all up in your Aery ninjaing yo Ridills and abjs, because they are not willing to let a situation happen where one person is botting and they are not.
Yes this is a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma, but different in the outside external negative values which give it more of a commons standpoint.
Also, what you will see in playing multiple rounds of the same game is that even if one LS has a huge value for p, over time the negative utility by camping an LS that bots will constantly increase while the p value remains static or decreases, so in the long run the LS either bots...or stops camping the given NM.
Discuss.
PS. I don't bot so don't throw around accusations at me.