Religulous

[Kaylia]

A model isn't a proof, it's something you use to explain what you see. Because you can't see beyond Higg boson doesn't mean there is nothing more fundamental. When you try to observe something like this, you observe the disintegration product and try to guess the causality chains between the particule and your eyes.

Because the energy level used don't allow you to verify if there is something smaller (more fundamental), you can't say there is nothing else. You have to postulate it. You have to postulate that those paramaters are statics, and that it's not possible to understand them.

What we call "universe" could easily be a subcase of an even greater physics phenomenon. Higg boson and your structure (or anything you want to postulate in your models) might seem absolute in your frame of reference, but unless you try the experiment in many differents situation, you won't be able to tell the laws you found is absolute.

Because there is an infinity of possible frame of reference, it's not even possible to check them all and pretend something is absolute.

[Churchill]

I might fuck you but you're not coming across as intelligent.

[Kaliden]

I might fuck you but you're not coming across as intelligent.

That is not a girl.

[Kuya]

You dodge better than I do, as you are the one here postulating the inability to define our system.

And you display your ignorance of partical physics the more you type. Just because a particle exists, doesnt mean there are smaller particles to explain it. What we observe as particles in this physical plane may very well be nothing more than observed reactions in another timespace. Our definition of interacting particles is just a model to explain observed reactions at specific levels. Dont be so dense to think this physical universe is only 3 dimensions, and dont be so stupid as to be caught up in causality of a system that only really sees time in a few of its dimensions.

You really dont know much about physics/the universe/science in general to be arguing so vaguely about what we can or cannot know. It's pretty pathetic.

If what your postulating is string theory, then it doesn't escape the problem at all, you're still left with a vacuum state.

[Neosutra]

Which doesnt really have anything to do with Kaylia's statements. Actually nothing Kaylia said has anything to do with this argument.

But string theory isnt the only theory that proposes models that offer explainations for our causel system. It is very naive to assume they dont/wont exist, simply because one person has severe ignorance of the subject.

[Demosthenes11]

why can't you ever have an argument without retarded personal attacks?
Even when you win, you still look retarded

[Kaylia]

Which doesnt really have anything to do with Kaylia's statements. Actually nothing Kaylia said has anything to do with this argument.

But string theory isnt the only theory that proposes models that offer explainations for our causel system. It is very naive to assume they dont/wont exist, simply because one person has severe ignorance of the subject.

Where did I say we can't build a new model? We can, and we will build new model, it's just that they are not the ultimate flawless model you pretend they are. You will need many postulates to make them "exact".


And seriously, explain your point instead of saying "you're wrong" over and over. Why do you believe we can have an absolute model that require no postulate? Why is it illogical to think we can't build a model without postulate?

[Kuya]

I know; the Loop theory also tries to explain the same thing, but the problem remains that none of this is empiricist, and just because it isn't does not mean it does not deserve to be postulated. In fact, many physicists have railed against ST because they claim you cannot prove it at those extremely high levels of energy at the plank scale.

Returning to the point of all this; you will by necessity have to adopt a skeptic position in regards to any postulation, including the postulate of a deity being involved in any of these processes. It does not matter if you find it silly, the idea is that you can't prove it hence it is pointless to argue against it when no prove for or against can be levied; we know theism is not scientific hence it does not go under the same scrutiny ST goes under because some argue that is places itself in a position where it can't be scrutinized or rather verified. Scientists just don't waste their time with this, and most would rather adopt a position of agnosticism to be correct, even if in practical terms they think that theism may very well be wrong, they will still be in a position where trying to contend it is false is pointless or unproductive. Your entire argument should have just stuck to a functionalist field instead of trying to head off into a essentialist argument; you can attempt to contend that religions (you're not just attacking theism here, remember?) are harmful, worthless, and can be replaced, but if you're going to do that, you have to be very detailed, and avoid making generalized statements that obfuscate the debate.

[Kaylia]

I know; the Loop theory also tries to explain the same thing, but the problem remains that none of this is empiricist, and just because it isn't does not mean it does not deserve to be postulated. In fact, many physicists have railed against ST because they claim you cannot prove it at those extremely high levels of energy at the plank scale.

A loop theory doesn't explain why the loop is there in the first place. It would also create huge empirical problems, since interacting with anything would change the whole universe (if I understand it correctly).

[Kaylia]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6...eness_theorems
After a short discussion with Woozie, I learned that what I was trying to say was done already, and that I should have quoted wiki right from the beginning

Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory.


The resulting true but unprovable statement is often referred to as "the Gödel sentence" for the theory, although there are infinitely many other statements in the theory that share with the Gödel sentence the property of being true but not provable from the theory.

Roughly speaking, for each theory T the corresponding Gödel sentence G asserts: "G cannot be proved within the theory T". If G were provable under the axioms and rules of inference of T, then T would have a theorem, G, which effectively contradicts itself, and thus the theory T would be inconsistent. This means that if the theory T is consistent then G cannot be proved within it. This means that G's claim about its own unprovability is correct; in this sense G is not only unprovable but true. Thus provability-within-the-theory-T is not the same as truth; the theory T is incomplete.

It is possible to define a larger theory T' that contains the whole of T, plus G as an additional axiom. In this case, G is indeed a theorem in T' (trivially so, since it is an axiom). However, there will be a new Gödel statement G' for T', showing that T' is also incomplete. Each theory has its own Gödel statement.

In order to prove the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel represented statements by numbers. Then the theory at hand, which is assumed to prove certain facts about numbers, also proves facts about its own statements. Questions about the provability of statements are represented as questions about the properties of numbers, which would be decidable by the theory if it were complete. In these terms, the Gödel sentence states that no natural number exists with a certain, strange property. A number with this property would encode a proof of the inconsistency of the theory. If there were such a number then the theory would be inconsistent, contrary to the consistency hypothesis. So, assuming the theory is consistent (as done in the theorem's hypothesis) there is no such number.

I will ask the same question you avoided many time already. Can a model explain itself without any postulates? If yes, can you prove his demonstration wrong?

[Neosutra]

That has nothing to do with modeling causel 3-space, or modeling relativistic particle interactions. You really dont even know what you are trying to say anymore do you? Also, no one said a theory exists that will contain all the answers, but rather theories that can model our systems beyond the causel time space you get caught on so easily. There are however, plausible explainations for any given phenomina, beyond that of saying "magic did it".

If you dont like theories that model themselves w/o postulates, then you really shouldnt vouch for the theory of god, because its the worst one to do this.

[Kuya]

Again, that's not the point, the point is, unlike you mentioned, it is very likely that every time you postulate something to explain the former, it will have to have another postulate or axiom to explain it, therefore unlike your previous statement, absolute truth is likely impossible, and anything that tries to allege it by necessity cannot be proven. The point isn't to vouch for a deity, the point is that there can be no way to prove it or disprove it and your only criteria is plausibility(or whatever sounds less silly), and hence debating about a god in this manner is best left for philosophical debates meant for entertainment. You can, however, argue about the functionality of religion and spirituality, which is far more accessible.

[Kaylia]

That has nothing to do with modeling causel 3-space, or modeling relativistic particle interactions. You really dont even know what you are trying to say anymore do you?

It's funny you say this, because I know for a while where I want to go with this.

1st: Make you admit that no model can explain itself, and that you always need an outside element (postulate) to complete it.

2nd: Because no model can explain itself, as demonstrated by the logical argument posted above, science will never be able to explain everything. You will always need to postulate the existence of an outside element.

3rd: Because this outside element can't be defined with anything from your model, there will always be something that is not defined.


I'm not sure what kind of magic you use to get ride of this paradox, but I would like to know. I'm also curious to hear how you can disprove logic with relativity and 3d space....I personally woudln't trust a science that defy logic.

[Kaylia]

If you dont like theories that model themselves w/o postulates, then you really shouldnt vouch for the theory of god, because its the worst one to do this.

It's not a question of liking, no theory can exist without postulate.

That has nothing to do with modeling causel 3-space, or modeling relativistic particle interactions

Logic has nothing to do with science? What was posted is true for any models....I feel sorry for you if your model break logics.

Again, that's not the point, the point is, unlike you mentioned, it is very likely that every time you postulate something to explain the former

Actually, it's not just "very likely", it's impossible. There is also a demonstration that if a model don't need any axiom to explain itself, it's wrong.

[Suiram]

When I first learned the Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, one of the first things I was taught (after the substance of the proof itself) is that there is a common mistake in philosophy to want to draw broad metaphysical conclusions from it. In fact, while certain models are typically used in an explanation of the theorem (and its immediate proof-theoretic and model-theoretic consequences), the proof itself can be effected more-or-less entirely syntactically, without reference to models (which for that matter in formal logic, are of an entirely different sort than the word as it has been used heretofore in this discussion).

[Kaylia]

When I first learned the Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, one of the first things I was taught (after the substance of the proof itself) is that there is a common mistake in philosophy to want to draw broad metaphysical conclusions from it. In fact, while certain models are typically used in an explanation of the theorem (and its immediate proof-theoretic and model-theoretic consequences), the proof itself can be effected more-or-less entirely syntactically, without reference to models (which for that matter in formal logic, are of an entirely different sort than the word as it has been used heretofore in this discussion).

I'm not drawing any broad metaphysical conclusion from it. I'm simply saying that you won't be able to find any absolute model in sciences because of this. If it's impossible to describe everything, there will always be some unknown somewhere, something we can't predict.


http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strings02/dirac/hawking/
Interesting link sent to me by Woozie. It's a lecture by Hawking. Added spoiler because it's kinda long

Spoiler: show

In the years since 1985, we have realized that both supergravity and string theory, belong to a larger structure, known as M theory.why it should be called M Theory, is completely obscure. M theory, is not a theory in the usual sense.Rather it is a collection of theories, that look very different, but which describe the same physical situation. These theories are related by mappings, or correspondences, called dualities, which imply that they are all reflections of the same underlying theory. Each theory in the collection, works well in the limit, like low energy, or low dilaton, in which its effective coupling is small, but breaks down when the coupling is large. This means that none of the theories, can predict the future of the universe, to arbitrary accuracy.for that, one would need a single formulation of M-theory, that would work in all situations.

Up to now, most people have implicitly assumed that there is an ultimate theory, that we will eventually discover.Indeed, I myself have suggested we might find it quite soon. However, M-theory has made me wonder if this is true.Maybe it is not possible to formulate the theory of the universe in a finite number of statements. This is very reminiscent of Goedel's theorem.This says that any finite system of axyoms, is not sufficient to prove every result in mathematics.

Goedel's theorem is proved using statements that refer to themselves.sUch statements can lead to paradoxes.aN example is, this statement is false. If the statement is true, it is false.and if the statement is false, it is true. Another example is, the barber of Corfoo shaves every man who does not shave himself. Who shaves the barber?if he shaves himself, then he doesn't, and if he doesn't, then he does. Goedel went to great lengths to avoid such paradoxes, by carefully distinguishing between mathematics, like 2+2 =4,and meta mathematics, or statements about mathematics, such as mathematics is cool, or mathematics is consistent. that is why his paper is so difficult to read.but the idea is quite simple. First Goedel showed that each mathematical formula, like 2+2=4, can be given a unique number, the Goedel number.the Goedel number of 2+2=4, is *. Second, the meta mathematical statement, the sequence of formulas A, is a proof of the formula B, can be expressed as an arithmetical relation between the Goedel numbers for A- and B. Thus meta mathematics can be mapped into arithmetic, though I'm not sure how you translate the meta mathematical statement, 'mathematics is cool'. Third and last, consider the self referring Goedel statement, G.tHis is, the statement G can not be demonstrated from the axyoms of mathematics. Suppose that G could be demonstrated.tHen the axyoms must be inconsistent, because one could both demonstrate G, and show that it can not be demonstrated. On the other hand, if G can't be demonstrated, then G is true.bY the mapping into numbers, it corresponds to a true relation between numbers, but one which can not be deduced from the axyoms. Thus mathematics is either inconsistent, or imcomplete.tHe smart money, is on imcomplete.

What is the relation between Goedels theorem, and whether we can formulate the theory of the universe, in terms of a finite number of principles. One connection is obvious.aCcording to the positivist philosophy of science, a physical theory, is a mathematical model.sO if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted. One example might be the Golbach conjecture.gIven an even number of wood blocks, can you always divide them into two piles, each of which can not be arranged in a rectangle.tHat is, it contains a prime number of blocks.

Although this is incompleteness of sort, it is not the kind of unpredictability I mean.gIven a specific number of blocks, one can determine with a finite number of trials, whether they can be divided into two primes. But I think that quantum theory and gravity together, introduces a new element into the discussion, that wasn't present with classical Newtonian theory. In the standard positivist approach to the philosophy of science, physical theories live rent free in a Platonic heaven of ideal mathematical models. That is, a model can be arbitrarily detailed, and can contain an arbitrary amount of information, without affecting the universes they describe. But we are not angels, who view the universe from the outside.iNstead, we and our models, are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a physical theory, is self referencing, like in Goedels theorem.oNe might therefore expect it to be either inconsistent, or imcomplete.tHe theories we have so far, are ~both inconsistent, and imcomplete.

Quantum gravity is essential to the argument..THe information in the model, can be represented by an arrangement of particles.aCcording to quantum theory, a particle in a region of a given size, has a certain minimum amount of energy. Thus, as I said earlier, models don't live rent free.tHey cost energy.By Einsteins famous equation, E = mc squared, energy is equivalent to mass.aNd mass causes systems to collapse under gravity. It is like getting too many books together in a library.tHe floor would give way, and create a black hole that would swallow the information. Remarkably enough, Jacob Bekenstein and I, found that the amount of information in a black hole, is proportional to the area of the boundary of the hole, rather than the volume of the hole, as one might have expected. The black hole limit on the concentration of information, is fundamental, but it has not been properly incorporated into any of the formulations of M theory that we have so far. They all assume that one can define the wave function at each point of space.bUt that would be an infinite density of information, which is not allowed. On the other hand, if one can't define the wave function point wise, one can't predict the future to arbitrary accuracy, even in the reduced determinism of quantum theory. What we need, is a formulation of M theory, that takes account of the black hole information limit.bUt then our experience with supergravity and string theory, and the analogy of Goedels theorem, suggest that even this formulation, will be imcomplete.

Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory, that can be formulated as a finite number of principles.I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind. I'm now glad that our search for understanding will never come to an end, and that we will always have the challenge of new discovery.wIthout it, we would stagnate. Goedels theorem ensured there would always be a job for mathematicians.I think M theory will do the same for physicists. I'm sure Dirac would have approved.

[Suiram]

I'm not drawing any broad metaphysical conclusion from it. I'm simply saying that you won't be able to find any absolute model in sciences because of this. If it's impossible to describe everything, there will always be some unknown somewhere, something we can't predict.


http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strings02/dirac/hawking/
Interesting link sent to me by Woozie. It's a lecture by Hawking. Added spoiler because it's kinda long

There is a difference between saying "this is a result of the Incompleteness Theorem" and "there is a similarity, in theories of the material universe, to the Incompleteness Theorem in formal arithmetic." In the passage you quoted, Hawking is also careful to make that distinction, and seems to me to be saying only the latter, which I do not object to.

[Kaylia]

Our physics model are always described with mathematics, and because of this, they will have to answer to this theorem one way or the other. The universe could be finite, the first cause might be something we postulated, but we will never be able to say it is without any doubt.

[Suiram]

That's a rather roundabout way of arriving at your conclusion. We won't know today if the Dow Jones will go down 1000 points or up 2000 points on Tuesday, but if I were to say that this is because we model Economics with mathematics and there are undecidable sentences in arithmetic I don't believe you would agree with me there as to the source of the uncertainty.

[Kaylia]

A model that can't predict everything isn't a model, it's an incomplete model.


If we managed to include every single being and natural phenomenon on Earth, there is probably a good chance our economy model would be nearly perfect..until a comet fall down on Earth. You would then have to add outside events to your model.

The perfect model doesn't exist, there will alway be something bigger that could affect your previous model and make your result innacurate.

[edit]
In physics, you will always have to work with the postulate that what we observed is absolute, and not a subcase of a bigger phenomenon. That alone is a pretty big guess imo.