I like this column from Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was the ex-exterior minister for Israel.
La agonía de Gaza y la trampa de Israel · ELPAÍS.com
With all the rockets that are launched daily against Israeli towns from Gaza, plus the political rivalry between the Israelis to see who offers the toughest response agaisnt Hamas as the ability of the Egyptian government to mediate a new cease-fire, stronger than the previous one has been seriously damaged by its own tensions with Islamists in Gaza, a massive Israeli military operation was only a matter of time.Hamas, as an authority, must be judged by its ability to provide security and a decent government to the people of Gaza, but as a movement, it is incapable of betraying his relentless efforts to fight the occupying Israeli to death. After all, it did not win the elections to make peace with Israel and improve relations with the United States. For how promising some sporadic signs of approaching the field of political realism may be, its immediate priority is not to betray its own raison d'etre by showing their support for the Annapolis process of Americans.The Kassam rocket attack by Hamas, which has turned the western Negev into a hostage to the whims of Islamist death squads, is not an attempt to drag Israel into a costly invasion that could shake the regime, but a measure to establish a balance of threats based on keeping alive the flames of a low-intensity conflict even with an inevitable new truce.A Hamas that is increasingly arrogant and extremely well armed, confident that the truce was agreed only in exchange for further concessions from Israel and Egypt: the opening of the steps in Gaza, including the Rafah crossing, controlled by the Egyptians (adamant in its position that it should remain closed), the release of Hamas prisoners in Egypt, the suspension of Israel attacks against Hamas activists in West Bank and the right to respond to any alleged violation of the ceasefire by Israel.However, the attitude of Hamas has proved to be a dangerous exercise of political suicide, because a low-intensity conflict could easily escalate into a real fire fight if, as has happened now, containment shown so far by the Israelis becomes politically untenable . Unlike the Israeli attack against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the current operation is not an impulsive reaction triggered by an unexpected casus belli, but instead a decision that is intended to change the strategic equation between Israel and the Hamas regime in Gaza.Nor was it a completely unreasonable exercise of political suicide, because the legacy of the unsuccessful attempt by Israel to destroy Hezbollah in 2006 is that the Israeli military machine has been devoted for the first time in the history of the country, to advocating containment and to oppose tougher measures proposed in the meetings of the council of ministers. The army did not want this war, it was resigned to the inevitability. The strength of Israel to launch a massive attack against the Hamas regime in Gaza stems from a detailed analysis of the limits of what can be achieved by force, to the point that the minister Barak was willing to pay a high political price in the middle of election season, to accept a new truce, even if the Hamas violated it intermittently.A military attack on a strip of land so small and so densely populated, in which Hamas has systematically used civilians as human shields, will without a choice submit the Israeli army to accusations of war crimes. However justified the actions of Israel, and no matter how much the international community criticizes the repressive and obscurantist Hamas in Gaza, it will take little to see that the coverage of civilian casualties in the media will put Israel, and not Hamas, in the pillory of international opinion. Israel would prefer to avoid at all costs a massive invasion, if only because the reoccupation of Gaza would mean having to assume sole responsibility of one and a half million Palestinians who now live under the control of Hamas.But while Israel may be willing to absorb the cost of harsh international condemnation, it is unclear what a real victory in a war like this is. Is it a realistic option in overthrowing the regime of Hamas? Perhaps the fall of an Ismail Hanyieh government, but Hamas would remain a powerful natural product of Palestine bringing together the people around them. Even under a new Israeli occupation, the occupant could suffer the ultimate humiliation if they continue to launch Kassam missiles while the Israeli armored divisions are deployed in the strip.A shame that politicians trying to win elections is one of the pushing reasons for the death of over 300 people, and much worse, that, over 300 people will die, and nothing will be gained of it.And finally, after you have a dealt fatal blow to what remained of the peace process and cemeteries in Israel and a re-torn Gaza filled with victims, Israel would like to get out of this trap and re-negotiate another cease fire ... with the same Hamas.
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