Faith and Reason.

[Vail]

Also, doesn't omnipotent and omniscient imply omnipresent? Even if not, the argument still stands, God cannot be all three of those things at once.

and why not? all powerful, all knowing and everywhere. I really don't get why this is impossible, unless you're basing this off the that we've been unable to see God everywhere? (testing god's all power or all knowledge would obviously be beyond us at this point)

[Denchi]

G.W. Leibniz

"The complete or perfect notion of an individual substance contains all of its predicates, past, present, and future. For certainly it is now true that a future predicate will be, and so it is contained in the notion of a thing. And thus everything that will happen to Peter or Judas, considered in the realm of possibility by withdrawing the mind from the divine decree for creating him, and is seen there by God. And from that it is obvious that God chose from an infinite number of possible individuals those he thought most in accord with the supreme and hidden ends of his wisdom. Properly speaking, he did not decide that Peter sin or that Judas be damned, but only that Peter who would sin with certainty, though not with necessity, but freely, and Judas who would suffer damnation would attain existence rather than other possible things; that is, he decreed that the possible notion become actual. And, although the future salvation of Peter is also contained in his eternal possible notion, it is, however, not without the concurrence of grace, for in the same perfect notion of that possible Peter, even the aid of divine grace to be given him is found, under the notion of possibility."

Paraphrased: God chooses to create individuals who are most in accordance with his plan. But people are people, and they sin. While God is certainly in knowledge of this, he doesn't create people TO sin, they sin on their own. But at the same time, he is still the creator. He can still have grace for his creations. But it's not like he makes people sin.

[Linliel]

I remember reading something by G.W. Leibniz that addressed the "Ever-knowing but also free will" argument.

"The complete or perfect notion of an individual substance contains all of its predicates, past, present, and future. For certainly it is now true that a future predicate will be, and so it is contained in the notion of a thing.

This is a similar idea to one called hylomorphism, which is an ancient Greek idea (Aristotle and the acorn "striving" to become the oak tree). That doesn't impact the argument, but I thought you might find the drawing on the "wisdom of the ancients" interesting.

Properly speaking, he did not decide that Peter sin or that Judas be damned, but only that Peter who would sin with certainty, though not with necessity, but freely ... that is, he decreed that the possible notion become actual.

OK so from what I understand he's saying that God decided that Peter would sin freely. This is still illogical! God knew what was going to happen and how it was going to get that way. Jesus even came up to Peter beforehand and said that he was going to deny him. How can that be a free notion when it was obvious God (and Jesus) knew what was going on, and what was going to happen? Just because God decided that Peter would sin *freely* doesn't give Peter free will. God has *still decided* that Peter is going to sin. The fact that it now has a "freely" attached to it doesn't actually make it free, because they still know what he's going to do & thus he is condemned to doing it!

I'm not sure what this guy means when he says about Judas gaining existence, but this doesn't solve the problem for me yet.

And, although the future salvation of Peter is also contained in his eternal possible notion, it is, however, not without the concurrence of grace, for in the same perfect notion of that possible Peter, even the aid of divine grace to be given him is found, under the notion of possibility."

I think I need more context to understand what he's saying here. I don't know what "grace" means in this context, for example.

[Tristam]

G.W. Leibniz
that is, he decreed that the possible notion become actual.

sooo, he made someone do something.

Paraphrased: a 16th century dude said something that may or may not be true and he has no way of actually knowing.

[Linliel]

Paraphrased: God chooses to create individuals who are most in accordance with his plan. But people are people, and they sin. While God is certainly in knowledge of this, he doesn't create people TO sin, they sin on their own. But at the same time, he is still the creator. He can still have grace for his creations. But it's not like he makes people sin.

Well then he's kinda missing the point. The point is that with God being all powerful, all-present, and all-knowing, and the future and the past, the alpha and the omega, etc. etc. means that *logically speaking* he has to know and because it is within his plan, he has to be directing the courses of action that people take in order for his plan to succeed, including the sinning bits.

People may want to ascribe some sort of free will in there, but wishes aren't fishes, and so either you have to accept the logical impossibility of the thing or accept that God isn't all-powerful/knowing/present.

[Denchi]

Aristotle's forms are confusing and kinda weird.

Knowing about something beforehand, and being the cause of that thing, are not the same. This statement addresses the idea that if God can create a person, then he must create that person to DO those bad things. I think that is flawed, logically it doesn't follow.

You can ask questions about where Sin comes from then, and what "sin" is. or bad things in general. But then you're going to be confronted with the idea that we, as humans, don't know what really is bad, and what is good, ultimately.


There are Christians that believe in predestination, and that some people are saved, and some people aren't, and that's the way God wanted it. It's a lot like what Jews believe. It's called Calvinism, you can look it up if you want to.

[Linliel]

Knowing about something beforehand, and being the cause of that thing, are not the same. This statement addresses the idea that if God can create a person, then he must create that person to DO those bad things. I think that is flawed, logically it doesn't follow.

Why doesn't it follow? God could just be a jerk.

[Tristam]

Aristotle's forms are confusing and kinda weird.

Knowing about something beforehand, and being the cause of that thing, are not the same. This statement addresses the idea that if God can create a person, then he must create that person to DO those bad things. I think that is flawed, logically it doesn't follow.

You can ask questions about where Sin comes from then, and what "sin" is. or bad things in general. But then you're going to be confronted with the idea that we, as humans, don't know what really is bad, and what is good, ultimately.


There are Christians that believe in predestination, and that some people are saved, and some people aren't, and that's the way God wanted it. It's a lot like what Jews believe. It's called Calvinism, you can look it up if you want to.

I had to study Calvinism, many of us did in history, I don't need to look it up.

Leibniz' quote suggests that instead of merely forcing, he rolls the dice but adjusts the odds and tilts the table, it's just unnecessary and ignores the very real possibility that Leibniz was wrong, which he was about other real things.

Of course people shouldn't believe in predestination, but predestination != lack of free will as it's being argued here.

[Denchi]

Oh, I never had to study Calvinism anywhere, it was new to me, so I just figured people hadn't heard about it.

I know he may be wrong, I just think it brings up an interesting point.

I think the opposite of Free Will would be Predestination in this context, no?

[Melchiah]

Knowing about something beforehand, and being the cause of that thing, are not the same. This statement addresses the idea that if God can create a person, then he must create that person to DO those bad things. I think that is flawed, logically it doesn't follow.

Yeah, but this isn't what Christians believe. Their concept of God isn't a creator who steps back and watches, their God is actively controlling his little ant farm, divine plan, divine will whatever you want to call it. Free will goes out the window.

[Kaylia]

I dont want to reply? Which question did I not answer? You are the only person here avoiding questions.

When you start talking about morality, you need to start looking at social science, psychology and philosophy. Morality is relative, but it is essentially the composite of any specific culture's societal imperitives (the things it has deemed needed to continue to be a benefitual society). We can get into a long tangent on moral relativism, hence why we shouldnt base our laws solely on what any given person finds to be "moral". We should base our laws on what we find to be universally and testably in detriment to the society or the people (i.e. killing your neighbor hurts the community by reducing the number of contributors, stealing from him reduces the resources and violates his trust, etc).

Surely you dont think science is limited to chemistry?

Earlier, you said morality is an act of reason. Now, you describe morality as what is the best for our society. Can you explain me why this truth is as reasonable as a scientific truth? "What is the best for our society" is a fine definition, but isn't it simply your new axiom?



Also, let's say you go on a forum and start calling people idiot? Is that act irrational, since it's clearly a violent act.

No, you cannot delineate a moral code with entropy. It's my observation that part of our sentience includes an inherent sense of right and wrong. In baser creatures, it's a biological imperative to refrain from killing each other. In our species, this biological imperative is at times superceded by other impulses. However, we do have the capacity to reason out that if we do something to another person, and it hurts them, it is reasonable to conclude that the same thing would hurt us as well. From that standpoint, we derive morality based upon putting ourselves in the shoes of another.

The correct moral decision can always be arrived at by placing one's self in the position of both parties being considered. If you wouldn't want someone to do something to you, then you shouldn't do this thing to someone else. Also, there is a moral decision to be made in punishing immorality with regard to severity of infraction versus severity of punishment. Again, the correct decision can be arrived at by placing oneself in the position of victim and offender.

These arguments are not entropic in nature, rather they fall under the realm of philosophy and other social sciences. While not exactly mathematically quantifiable, there are standards and observations and studies that qualify as evidence to support hypotheses. Social sciences are fuzzy, and I'm sure that any psychologist worth his diploma will admit that the field is far from absolute because not all minds/societies/cultures are created/developed the same.

There is nothing I disagree with here. That's pretty much how I see moral in our society

When I say moral require additional beliefs to works with reason, do you agree? Those beliefs would be something along the line of
- Don't do to others what you don't want to receive (empathy)
- Everyone has the same right (despite not being equal from a scientific standpoint)

While a selfish individual could go with
- Whatever benefit me is the best.

[Eratosthenes]

G.W. Leibniz

"The complete or perfect notion of an individual substance contains all of its predicates, past, present, and future. For certainly it is now true that a future predicate will be, and so it is contained in the notion of a thing. And thus everything that will happen to Peter or Judas, considered in the realm of possibility by withdrawing the mind from the divine decree for creating him, and is seen there by God.

It seems that this is saying God can know every possible instance of the future, but not which one will happen. This is essentially the same as a computer calculating every possible chess game; it can't know which particular game will be played. Instead of knowing everything that WILL happen, it's replaced with knowing everything that COULD happen.

And from that it is obvious that God chose from an infinite number of possible individuals those he thought most in accord with the supreme and hidden ends of his wisdom.

Here, Leibniz says God chooses which future will happen. It goes against his previous argument. God would still know everything that will happen, because he had chosen it.

Properly speaking, he did not decide that Peter sin or that Judas be damned, but only that Peter who would sin with certainty, though not with necessity, but freely, and Judas who would suffer damnation would attain existence rather than other possible things; that is, he decreed that the possible notion become actual. And, although the future salvation of Peter is also contained in his eternal possible notion, it is, however, not without the concurrence of grace, for in the same perfect notion of that possible Peter, even the aid of divine grace to be given him is found, under the notion of possibility."

This last section here, especially the bolded part, convinces me that Leibniz is arguing in favor of predestination.

[Tristam]

I think the opposite of Free Will would be Predestination in this context, no?

To put in the way I was thinking about it at least, humans can be the arbiters of free will but that dosen't make anything predestined.

[Max™]

The future exists.

It is there, it is simply out of sight, much in the same way the past is.

It doesn't defeat the concept of free will, anymore than the entirety of the universe to your left defeats your ability to move up or down.

Never mind the inherent fuzziness about reality, and the observer specific aspects suggested by both relativity and quantum mechanics in their own ways.

[Max™]

You need to get this theistic approach to seeing the world as magically advanced out of your head and start realizing that systems of advanced order are very testable in their formation, and typically a results from a great deal of time.

Not advanced, but it is weird that we find local decreases in entropy, when the general trend is to increase it.

Just because life happens, does not mean that it is a foregone conclusion, I guess that is what I am saying.

The universe did not have to be as it is, there are any number of possible ways it could have unfolded differently.

I'm not saying that is reason to claim it is intelligently designed or anything, I'm just saying it struck me as an odd observation.

[Max™]

Wow, that is both hilarious and reassuring.

That is a valid point, Atheism requires an unfalsifiable assumption of belief, whereas an agnostic can truly claim logical reasons for saying they do not know, they can state they do or do not expect to find this or that conclusion, but are aware of the impossibility to confirm or deny this god hypothesis.

[kareface]

That is a valid point, Atheism requires an unfalsifiable assumption of belief, whereas an agnostic can truly claim logical reasons for saying they do not know, they can state they do or do not expect to find this or that conclusion, but are aware of the impossibility to confirm or deny this god hypothesis.

False. Atheism is the absence of belief, not always the belief in absence. It's not an act, it's the lack of believe that defines it.

The universe did not have to be as it is, there are any number of possible ways it could have unfolded differently.

There are ideas about the possibility of the fundamental constants being linked to each other and rather inflexible. If that's the case, the universe might not of had any option but to be what it is today.

When I say moral require additional beliefs to works with reason, do you agree? Those beliefs would be something along the line of
- Don't do to others what you don't want to receive (empathy)
- Everyone has the same right (despite not being equal from a scientific standpoint)

You say belief, but this may be an evolutionary imperative. It may exist because w/o it our species would of died. There may of even been species of mammal that did lack what you could call morality, and they ended up dead as a result. Something that we must be born with for our species to survive isn't something that I would regard as a belief.

[Demosthenes11]

False. Atheism is the absence of belief, not always the belief in absence. It's not an act, it's the lack of believe that defines it.

so atheists believe nothing yet are...vehement and adamant in these "thoughts"

[Max™]

Agnostic is lack of belief.

Atheist broken down means without gods.

a⋅the⋅ist
   /ˈeɪθiɪst/
–noun
a person who denies or disbelieves the existence of a supreme being or beings.

ag⋅nos⋅tic
   /ægˈnɒstɪk/
–noun
1. a person who holds that the existence of the ultimate cause, as God, and the essential nature of things are unknown and unknowable, or that human knowledge is limited to experience.
2. a person who denies or doubts the possibility of ultimate knowledge in some area of study.


You can describe a universe with different fundamental constants, and all currently workable theories involve the relationships between the forces and constants as a result of symmetry breaking in the early universe.

There is no evidence that there is a predestined way for that breaking to occur, though it definitely implies that differences in one of the resulting forces would be reflected in the others most likely.

[Kaylia]

False. Atheism is the absence of belief, not always the belief in absence. It's not an act, it's the lack of believe that defines it.

The word you're looking for is agnosticism.

You need belief to affirm anything about the non-existance of a God. If it's just a "hunch" you have, you can't logically come to any conclusion, unless you believe it's correct.