
Originally Posted by
James K. Fitzpatrick
The time may come when the societal bonds are so ruptured that forceful confrontation will become necessary with those who, until then, had been our fellow citizens. The corollary, of course, is that we cannot in good conscience call for an application of lethal force against our neighbors until that moment arrives. There must be a marked debasement of the social compact. For all but the most radical pro–lifers, such a devolution has not yet occurred. Pro–life Americans are not willing to accept the sight of abortionists, their staff, and the women who employ them lying dead in our streets, because they remain our neighbors. They are neighbors who have fallen into evil ways on the issue of abortion, but neighbors nonetheless, fellow citizens who have permitted material concerns and self–centeredness to cloud their judgment on the question of abortion.
Historical parallels are hard to come by to press this point. After all, we are talking about large numbers of our neighbors reaching the conclusion that it should be legal to kill unborn children. The Civil War offers certain insights, however. It has been well documented that slavery was not the only issue in that conflict. But it was the central issue for Christian abolitionists in the North. By 1860 they were willing to take up arms against supporters of the Confederacy to end slavery. The question is: Why then? Why not before? Radical abolitionists such as John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison had called for military action against the South long before the war, but others were not as militant. They were willing to bide their time, seek a moral conversion of the slaveholders, work for a political solution even if that solution were to take many years.
Yet when war was declared there were few protests from these moderate factions. What had changed? Why was there a new willingness to back the use of force? It was not a result of a sudden breakthrough in their awareness of the evils of slavery. The writings and speeches of antislavery Americans in the middle years of the nineteenth century make clear that they had always viewed slavery as unequivocally immoral.
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The defenders of abortion include within their ranks many of our cultural leaders, including members of the clergy, people whose opinion is respected in other areas, whose views are lauded on the talk shows and in academic circles—the proverbial “best and brightest.” Moreover, many pro–lifers have family members who disagree with them on abortion. All this makes a difference. It causes even militant pro–lifers to intuit that there is something markedly different between Nazi concentration camp guards and, say, the pro–choice delegates to the Democratic National Convention or members of the local chapter of the League of Women Voters.
Does a willingness to entertain apologies for the pro–abortion sentiments of their fellow citizens imply a degree of doubt about the nature of abortion on the part of pro–life Americans? To a certain extent—yes. It indicates, at the least, that pro–life Americans understand what causes many of their fellow citizens to err on this question. Let us once again consider the abolitionists to illustrate the point.
One could argue that the willingness to compromise with slaveholders in the years before the Civil War implied some self–doubt among early abolitionists; that their spirit of tolerance indicated, perhaps, that early abolitionists questioned the fitness of Southern slaves for equal membership in American society. This explains why so much abolitionist energy was directed toward returning blacks to Africa after emancipation. It seems fair to conclude that there was considerable sympathy in the North for those Southerners who hesitated to free their slaves in fear of what emancipation would do to their society. The fear was seen as not entirely unjustified. In other words, Southern slaveholders were viewed as being in error on the question of slavery by early abolitionists, but not as irretrievably evil men and women because of that failure. They were to be given time to come around to the truth, time to work out the social adjustments needed to deal with emancipation.
This, I submit, is also the view—more sensed than articulated at this point—of modern pro–life activists toward their pro–abortion fellow citizens. It is what explains why George W. Bush is able to react with such composure to his mother’s pro–choice views. As he phrases it, “Good people disagree about abortion.” While there is no reason to question Bush’s repeated assurance that his goal is to insure that “every unborn child will be protected in law and welcomed in life,” it is unlikely that Bush would have responded with such aplomb if it were discovered that his mother was a racist or anti–Semite. His reaction makes clear he does not think her error in this instance an egregious moral deficiency.
In other words, Bush is not so convinced of the persuasiveness of his pro–life position that he cannot imagine a high–minded individual coming to a different conclusion. I would argue that most pro–lifers are in the same boat. They do not see the mass of their pro–abortion fellow citizens as engaged in a calculated choice of evil. In fact, if pressed, I think most pro–life activists would concede that the fetus, especially in the early stages of its development, is not self–evidently (I repeat: not self–evidently) a human person; that there very well may be an element of religious belief that informs their conviction that human life begins at the moment of conception.
These distinctions are critical. We would not grant rapists, child molesters, or concentration camp guards any benefit of the doubt, regardless of how articulately they defended their behavior. We treat their transgressions as self–evident evils, their attempts at self–justification as crass dissimulation. That we treat differently Americans who promote and participate in abortions indicates our grasp of how easy it is for otherwise upstanding members of society to fall into error on this question—in spite of [the pro-life] conviction that [abortion] is an abomination.